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Abstract 
This paper investigates the impact of corruption on economic growth in the Italian 
regions. We estimate a dynamic growth model for the period 1980-2004 
addressing both the potential bias of the measures of corruption and the 
endogeneity between corruption and economic development. We find strong 
evidence of a negative correlation between corruption and growth. Moreover, since 
government intervention has been traditionally used to reduce income differentials 
between the northern and the southern regions, we also analyse the interaction 
between corruption and government expenditure. Our results indicate that 
corruption undermines the positive impact that public expenditures have on 
economic growth. 
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Introduction 
Does corruption ‘sand’ or ‘grease the wheels’ of economic development? For a 
long time, scholars have investigated the economic consequences of corruption, 
drawing an ambivalent picture: on the one hand, corruption promotes investments 
that would have been otherwise stalled by regulations and bureaucratic 
procedures; on the other, it reduces the incentives to invest in productive activities. 
Therefore, the effect of corruption on growth remains an empirical question. 
We contribute to this debate by estimating the effect of corruption on economic 
growth in a panel dataset for the 20 Italian regions during the period 1980-2004 to 
verify whether corruption played a role in the differentiated growth path of southern 
Italy. Italy is an interesting case in this perspective because regional inequalities 
still persist although different kinds of public policies have tried to reduce the per 
capita income differentials between the northern and the southern regions since 
the end of World War II (see Padovano, 2007). The distribution of corruption and of 
social capital across the country is not homogeneous even though the institutions 
and the policies aimed at punishing and preventing corruption are centralized at 
the national level, and this may contribute to explain the differences in the 
economic growth rates of the Italian regions. 
So far the literature has not paid much attention to the Italian case, mainly due to 
the low quality of available data until the very recent years. Del Monte and Papagni 
(2001) investigated the link between corruption and economic growth in the Italian 
regions for the period 1963-1991. They show that the efficiency of public 
investments is lower in regions where corruption is higher which in turn negatively 
affects economic growth. We re-address this issue for a more recent period of the 
Italian history (1980-2004) characterised by high variability in both growth rates 
and corruption crimes. We use a newly assembled dataset which has the 
advantage of collecting economic, socio-demographic and politico-institutional 
variables at regional level and provide a methodological solution to the 
shortcomings of the commonly used measures of corruption. We also move a step 
forward with respect to the existing literature by using an estimation technique 
which reduces the endogeneity bias of the coefficients. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on 
the nexus between corruption and economic growth; Section 3 describes the 
institutional context of the Italian regions and shows the time dynamics of our key 
variables, namely economic growth and corruption. In Section 4 we formulate our 
empirical strategy, present the empirical model and discuss the results. The last 
section provides some concluding remarks. 
Literature review 
Many economists consider corruption as a major obstacle to economic growth 
(see, among others, Myrdal, 1989; Andvig and Moene, 1990; Shleifer and Vishny, 
1993; Blackburn et al., 2006). The main argument is that a government official that 
controls the supply of an individually-demanded service may abuse his arbitrary 
power to restrict the supply, for example, denying or delaying permissions. The 
elimination of these barriers requires an extra-price of the service, i.e. a bribe that 
increases the bureaucrats' rent. Nonetheless, the bribe removes also any incentive 
to invest and defines a sub-optimal rent-seeking equilibrium of human capital that 
hampers growth. Mauro (1995), Keefer and Knack (1997), Hall and Jones (1999), 
La Porta et al. (1999), Li et al. (2000) and Gyimah - Brempong (2002) estimate the 
impact of corruption on growth for a wide cross - section of countries. They verify 
that higher levels of corruption significantly reduce both investment and economic 
growth. Interestingly, larger levels of corruption are associated to a misallocation of 
public resources. Mauro (1998), Tanzi and Davoodi (1998), Gupta et al. (2001), 
Baldacci et al. (2004) find that corruption distorts the composition of government 
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expenditure towards less productive activities and creates large public sectors 
where resources are wasted through rent seeking. 
Some scholars, on the other hand, argue that corruption is not a totally inefficient 
activity because in the short run it solves some government failures (Leff , 1964; 
Huntinghton, 1968). This ‘greasing the wheels’ hypothesis, however, limits the 
growth-enhancing effect of corruption to those situations where governance is 
lacking and/or economic policy is inefficient. Lui (1985) formalizes this argument 
into a model where firms value the time to waste in a queue. The more productive 
firms want to waste as little time as possible in the queue; therefore they are willing 
to buy the priority of their activities by paying a bribe. Along this line of research 
Shleifer and Vishny (1994) develop a model of bargaining between politicians and 
enterprises and show that corruption can facilitate an efficient allocation of 
resources. This is because bribes are a way to distribute wealth between 
politicians and agents in the private sector. In other words, corruption increases 
efficiency by allowing private sector agents to buy their way out of the inefficiencies 
that would otherwise be introduced by the politicians. In this perspective, the 
existence of a negative linear relationship between corruption and growth is 
challenged in favour of a non-linear one, which predicts a positive growth effect at 
low levels of corruption incidence (see, among others, Kurrild-Klitgaard, 1988 and 
Acemoglu and Verdier, 1998).  
The ‘greasing the wheels hypothesis’ also implies that the relationship between 
corruption and economic growth can be affected by both the quality of the 
institutions and the size of the public sector. Ehrlich and Lui (1999) develop an 
endogenous growth model that analyzes the effect of corruption on economic 
growth in different politico-institutional settings. They predict that the balanced 
growth in a democracy (or competitive regime) and in an autocracy (or 
monopolistic regime) is the outcome of interaction between accumulation of human 
capital (socially productive) which engenders growth, and accumulation of political 
capital (socially unproductive) which mainly assures bureaucratic power and 
potential corruption. A non-linear relationship between corruption and growth is 
empirically found only in democratic regimes. Méndez and Sepulveda (2006) 
distinguish between ‘free’ and ‘not-free’ countries and include a measure of 
government expenditures to capture its interaction with corruption. Their findings 
show that in ‘free’ countries corruption results beneficial for economic growth at low 
levels of incidence and detrimental at high levels of incidence. This relationship is 
not modified by the size of government. 
Economic growth and corruption in the Italian regions: 
some stylized facts 
The institutional framework 
Italy is divided into 20 regions, that represent the upper tier of sub-state 
government. Five of them, established in the years between 1948 and 1963, enjoy 
a special statute (Regioni a Statuto Speciale, or RSS) because of their multilingual 
status and peculiar geographical and economic position. The other 15 regions, 
featuring an ordinary statute (Regioni a Statuto Ordinario, or RSO), were 
established in the 1970s. Until mid-1990s, however, the regions heavily depended 
on the central government. In particular, they have expenditure autonomy but 
lacked tax autonomy; regional resources were represented by transfers from 
national taxes and grants from the central government, whose amounts were not 
modifiable by the regions. Since the 1990s, several legislative and constitutional 
reforms changed the institutional framework and increased both tax autonomy and 
expenditure competences. Currently regional governments levy taxes of their own 
(about 24% of total national fiscal revenue), as well as shares of national taxes and 
transfers (about 53%) (Giardina et al, 2009), and are responsible for  health care 
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expenditure plus a share of social services, education, environment, local 
transportation, housing, culture and tourism. Differences in competences between 
the RSO and RSS have been reduced. 
Economic growth, corruption and associative crimes in the 
Italian regions 
Figure 1: Time dynamics of GDP growth and per capita corruption crimes  
 
Yearly data are averaged over the full sample. GDP growth is measured as the percentage change from 
the past years' GDP growth; crimes are measured as per capita prosecutions for corruption crimes. 
Source: Italian Institute of Statistics (ISTAT). 
Figure 1 illustrates an opposite trend in GDP growth and per capita prosecutions 
for corruption crimes. Overall economic growth decreased in Italy, with a significant 
fall in the early 90s. The growth rates always were under 5% after 1997 while 
corruption crimes increase steadily between the mid-1970s and the first half of the 
1990s and slightly decrease after 1993 as a consequence of the so-called Mani 
Pulite (Clean Hands) campaign undertaken by the judicial system. 
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Figure 2. GDP growth (average annual data) 
 
North: Piedmont, Val d'Aosta, Lombardy, Trentino-Alto Adige, Veneto, Friuli-Venezia Giulia, Liguria and 
Emilia Romagna; Centre: Tuscany, Umbria, Marche, Latium; South: Abruzzo, Molise, Apulia, Basilicata, 
Sardinia. 
Figure 2 shows that the level of GDP growth is quite homogeneous across the 
macro-areas, and displays a decreasing pattern during the period 1980 - 1995.1 
Within the South an important difference between the regions characterized by a 
pervasive presence of criminal organizations and the others emerges, which 
seems to account for 10%. 
                                                                                                         
1 Recently Daniele and Malanima (2007) describe the Mezzogiorno gap in GDP per capita between 
1861 and 2004. While uniformity characterizes the pre-industrial period, since the 1880s a long 
divergence phase starts between the industrial areas and those which were not able to create a 
manufacturing industry. This phase ends in 1951 when the GDP per capita in the southern regions was 
only 47% of that of the rest of Italy, then the convergence process continued until the first half of the 
1970s when the relative GDP per capita reached about 66%. During the 1980s a new phase of a 
divergence process begins until 2002. 
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Figure 3. Corruption crimes (average annual data) 
 
Note: North: Piedmont, Valle d'Aosta, Lombardy, Trentino-Alto Adige, Veneto, Friuli-Venezia Giulia, 
Liguria and Emilia Romagna; Center: Tuscany, Umbria, Marche, Latium; South: Abruzzo, Molise, 
Apulia, Basilicata, Sardinia. 
Figure 3 shows that the number of corruption crimes decreases in the 1980s; a 
significant increase is recorded from 1991 to 1998, where the number of crimes 
jumps from around 600 to around 2400; finally, after a decrease in 2000, it 
increased again. Sicily and Campania appear as the most corrupted regions of 
Italy, followed respectively by the northern, the central and the southern ones. 
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Table 1. GDP and prosecutions per capita (1980-2004, average annual data) 
Region GDP pc Region Associative 
crimes 
Region Corruption 
crimes 
Valle d'Aosta 21.147 
Sicily 42.1 Latium 961 
Trentino-Alto 
Adige 20.159 
Calabria 31.1 Molise 901.3 
Lombardy 19.715 
Campania 30.6 Valle d'Aosta 787.9 
Emilia-
Romagna 19.030 
Apulia 21.4 Liguria 775.1 
PiedmontPied
mont 17.53 
Basilicata 18 Calabria 699.8 
Veneto 17.22 
Liguria 15.6 Sicily 622 
Tuscany 16.54 
Latium 15.2 Sardinia 617.2 
Friuli-Venezia 
Giulia 16.1875 
Abruzzo 13.2 Friuli-Venezia 
Giulia 
607.7 
Latium 16.07 
Friuli-Venezia 
Giulia 
13.1 Abruzzo 601.2 
Liguria 15.79 
Emilia-
Romagna 
12.7 Campania 558.2 
Umbria 14.79 
Umbria 12.6 Basilicata 494 
Marche 14.47 
Trentino-Alto 
Adige 
11.7 Tuscany 494 
Abruzzo 12.54 
Lombardy 11.6 Apulia 483.6 
Sardinia 11.44 
Valle d'Aosta 11.4 Trentino-Alto 
Adige 
459.8 
Molise 11.001 
Molise 11.1 Umbria 456.7 
Sicily 10.42 
Veneto 10.9 Piedmont 426.3 
Basilicata 9.68 
Tuscany 10.8 Marche 393.8 
Apulia 9.61 
Piedmont 10 Lombardy 375.3 
Campania 9.56 
Marche 8 Veneto 374.6 
Calabria 8.71 
Sardinia 6.8 Emilia-
Romagna 
349.5 
Note: data are reported by descending order; per capita GDP is measured in thousands of euro; per 
capita crimes are measured per million of inhabitants. Source: Italian Institute of Statistics (ISTAT) 
Overall, GDP growth as well as corruption crimes change both over time and 
across regions. Table 1 provides a ranking of the regions according to their 
average GDP and corruption crimes per capita. Using prosecution data as a 
measure for corruption bumps against the circumstance that in corrupt regions the 
judicial system is itself corrupt and fewer people will be charged with corrupt 
practices. The effectiveness of a legal system is rooted not only in the formulation 
of laws but also in the ‘legal culture’, that is the expectations and practices that 
inform the way they are enforced (Treisman, 2000). 
Although the legal system is the same in all the Italian regions, its degree of 
legitimacy is not. Moreover, such a measure reflects only the ‘revealed’ corruption, 
most likely by leaving part of the phenomenon hidden. Table 1 highlights this 
problem. The northern regions are less corrupt than the central and southern 
regions; however, the ranking is not completely in line with people’s common 
sense about the real distribution of corruption in Italy. Indeed, prosecutions for 
corrupt practices in the Appeal Court district of Reggio Calabria, one of the major 
towns of Calabria, in the last twenty years resulted in two convictions only. 
Nevertheless, similar conditions characterize the districts of other ‘perceived’ 
corrupt regions, like Sicily, Campania and Sardinia (Davigo and Mannozzi, 2007). 
To take into account the hidden corruption and avoid potential bias between official 
statistics and ‘true’ data, we consider the existing link between corruption and 
associative crimes (crimes ex art. 416 and 416 bis of the Italian Criminal Law). This 
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implies that, as the so-called Mani Pulite criminal trials confirmed, corruption 
emerges not only as corrupt practices but also as associative crimes in the most 
‘perceived’ corrupt regions. 
Empirics 
Empirical strategy and model specification 
There are several issues related with the characteristics of the dataset that give 
reason for the choice of the estimator. First, the literature on corruption and growth 
generally estimates cross - sectional regressions by averaging the effect of 
temporary shocks and smoothing the cycling pattern of GDP. Although apparently 
straightforward, cross-country analyses make the implicit assumptions that 
countries are positioned on their steady state equilibria values for both the level of 
corruption and growth rate of output. Hence, averaging out data into a single 
observation for each region involves a loss of information and may also distort the 
analysis of the relationship between the two. Since the GDP growth rate as well as 
the corruption rate are not homogeneously distributed across regions and change 
over time, we employ a dynamic panel regression accounting also for the time 
variability of the data. 
Secondly, our dependent variable, GDP growth, reasonably follows an 
autoregressive trend and requires a dynamic specification. The small size of the 
dataset, limited to at most 20 observations, reduces the efficiency of the GMM 
estimators (Arellano and Bond, 1991; Blundell and Bond, 1998) and requires a 
correction (Bruno, 2005a and 200b).  
Another concern is related to data on prosecutions against corruption. This 
measure is problematic because a low rate of prosecutions may signal either a low 
effective incidence of corruption or a widespread hidden corruption. Moreover, it 
hits against the circumstance that in corrupt regions the judicial system may be 
itself corrupt and consequently fewer people would be charged with corruption 
crimes. 
Further, potential endogeneity may affect the relationship between corruption and 
growth. An extensive literature originated by Lipset (1960) considers that low levels 
of income generally determine corruption, i.e. less developed regions are 
endemically more corrupt. If this is the case, corruption would be correlated with 
the error term in the OLS regression and the estimates would be biased. To control 
for the problem of a two-way causality between corruption and growth, we estimate 
an equation of determinants of corruption through OLS and insert the estimated 
fitted values of the parameters of interest in our dynamic growth equation (Kelejian, 
1971; Petterson-Lidblom and Dahlberg, 2003).2 This procedure also allows us to 
take into account possible problems related to the quality of the legal system and 
the under-reporting. Indeed, the corruption equation controls for the degree of 
social capital which captures the existence of regional differences in people’s 
general attitude towards corruption.  
Based on these considerations we develop a two-step procedure. The first step 
estimates an equation of the determinants of corruption (see on this issue Fiorino 
and Galli, 2010). The fitted values obtained from this equation reduce the potential 
bias due to the heterogeneous distribution of social capital and quality of the legal 
system at regional level; moreover, the OLS estimation of this equation allows for 
                                                                                                         
2 Many authors have also worked with five-year averages for similar purposes. The use of five-year 
averages reduces short run fluctuations and allows to concentrate on the relationships between 
corruption and growth. See, for example, Li et al. (2000), Paldam (2002), Glaser and Saks (2006), 
Méndez and Sepulveda (2006). 
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removing endogeneity in the growth model.3 The second step estimates a growth 
equation and substitutes the corruption crimes with the fitted values obtained in 
first step. To control for the dynamic bias induced we follow the literature and apply 
a Least Squares Dummy Variables Corrected model (LSDVC, Bruno 2005a and 
2005b).  This estimator corrects the LSDV estimator4 for the small size of the 
sample and provides a significant reduction of the bias, performing as well as the 
GMM estimator properly identified.5 A slight limitation of this methodology is the 
requirement of exogenous right hand side variables. 
Sample data and description of variables 
Our dataset collects economic, socio-demographic and politico-institutional 
variables for the 20 Italian regions during the period 1980-2004 and consists of 500 
observations. The source, if not differently specified, is the Italian Institute of 
Statistics (ISTAT). The variables are summarized in Table 2. 
                                                                                                         
3 Petterson-Lidblom and Dahlberg (2003) show in fact that the use of the OLS estimates in the first 
stage allows us to obtain consistent estimates of the parameters of interest without the need to resort to 
the full blown functional form of the first stage. 
4 That is an OLS regression including regional dummies. We estimated also a set of LSDV uncorrected 
for the dynamic bias and obtain results consistent with the ones presented. 
5 An alternative dynamic estimator is the system GMM developed by Blundell and Bond (1998). This 
estimator adds to the equation in levels instrumented with differences (Arellano and Bond, 1991), a 
second equation in differences, instrumented with the variables in levels. When the GMM estimators are 
applied to small samples, the number of instruments outnumbers the observations, and overfit the 
lagged dependent variable. Instrument proliferation generates false positive results, reducing the 
reliability of the estimates. Roodman (2009) proposes to collapse the matrix of instruments to decrease 
their number. A rule of the thumb, however, suggests that to obtain robust test statistics one needs a 
number of instruments not larger than the number of groups. The GMM estimation of Equation 2 never 
satisfies the rule of thumb, as in the most parsimonious specification we use 23 instruments for 19 
groups. 
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics  
  Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
GDP growth 484 0.084 0.051 -0.003 0.257 
      
VARIABLES OF 
INTEREST: 
CORRUPTION 
     
COR, Individual 
crimes per 
pop(*1000) 
500 0.572 0.308 0.10 1.939 
ASCR, 
Associative 
crimes per 
pop(*1000) 
520 0.016 0.015 0 0.226 
      
Expenditure/GDP 456 0.46 6.127 0.003 130.992 
Current 
expenditure/GDP 444 -2.507 0.359 -3.355 -1.306 
Capital 
expenditure/GDP 444 -3.719 1.03 -5.870 -1.199 
Investments/GDP 
lag 460 0.067 0.024 0.029 0.197 
Public 
consumption/GD
P 
480 0.217 0.057 0.118 0.358 
Gini index 440 0.33 0.035 0.236 0.479 
School 
attainment 454 0.046 0.007 0.02 0.065 
Labor force units 500 1150.13 971.99 56.8 4508.7 
Population 576 2874227 2259821 112262 9742676 
 
Number of laws 460 50.25 26.40 3 165 
Fragmentation 460 0.668 0.13 0.128 0.880 
Voluntary 
organizations 460 449 555 11 5362 
Diffusion of 
newspapers 580 231811 221249 5687 1098279 
Referendum 
voters 460 1428645 1283230 31059 6177641 
Our first step consists in estimating an equation of the determinants of corruption. 
The equation is defined as follows:  
[1] CORRUPTIONit = f(Xit, eit) 
for i=1,...,20 and t=1980,...,2004, where X is a vector of explanatory variables and 
e is the error term. 
We measure CORRUPTION in two different ways: 1) the number of regional 
government officials prosecuted for corrupt practices relative to the population 
(COR). The crimes that we consider are based on the Libro II, Titolo II (crimes 
against the Public Administration) of the Italian Criminal Law as reported in the 
Annali di Statistiche Giudiziarie of the ISTAT (various issues). 2) A composite index 
annually computed per each region as the sum of per capita prosecutions and per 
capita associative crimes (COR+ASCR). This because the most important criminal 
trials against corruption in Italy (the so-called Mani Pulite and Maxi Trial of the 
Sicilian mafia) have confirmed that corrupt activities may emerge also in the form of 
other typologies of crimes like the associative crimes (crimes ex art. 416 and 416 
bis of the Italian Criminal Law) that cannot be strictly considered crimes of 
corruption.  
The explanatory variables are: 
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a) Population in millions of inhabitants, a proxy for the size of the region. If highly-
populated regions exploit economies of scale in supplying of public goods (Alesina 
and Wacziarg, 1997) and have a low ratio of public service outlets per population, 
individuals might revert to bribes to 'get ahead of the queue'. 
b) GDP growth is the annual growth of GDP per capita calculated starting from the 
yearly GDP data released by CRENOS (2004). The growth is defined as the ratio 
between the first difference and the lagged GDP, representing the percentage of 
shift from the previous year's aggregate output. Thus, GDPgrowthit = (GDPit - 
GDPi,t-1) / GDPi,t-1. Data are in constant terms. This variable, as well as education, 
is included to investigate the so-called Lipset hypothesis: voters with higher income 
(and education) are expected to be both more willing and capable to monitor public 
employees and to take action when the latter violate the law. Then, we expect a 
negative sign associated to both the coefficients of these variables.  
c) School attainment is a proxy for the level of education in the regions, measured 
as the share of high school enrolment over labour force.  
d) Gini index is the regional inequality level, built using micro-data on the 
households’ disposable income. These data come from the Survey of Household 
Income and Wealth (SHIW) conducted by the Bank of Italy (several years). The 
rationale is that as voters become more diverse along the income line, they will 
focus on redistribution rather than on the honesty of government officials (Mauro, 
1995; Alesina et al., 1996). We then expect that an increase in income inequality 
will positively affect the degree of corruption. 
e) Current expenditure/GDP and Capital expenditure/GDP capture the role of 
government size on corruption (and indirectly on growth).6 A larger government 
size may generate a potential for corruption by producing more resources to be 
stolen and more rules to be exploited or subverted. This can be the case for the 
Italian regions where the public sector plays a quite relevant role in the economy. 
Corruption alters the composition of government expenditures towards less 
productive activities and thus the greater the government expenditures the greater 
the negative effects of corruption (Mauro, 1998, Tanzi and Davoodi, 1998; Gupta et 
al., 2001). 
f) Number of laws enacted by the region is an alternative way to capture the impact 
of government size on corruption (Weingast et al., 1981). 
g) Fragmentation of regional government. When governments consist of large 
coalitions characterized by a certain number of parties with conflicting interests, the 
members of the coalition face a prisoner’s dilemma with respect to expenditures 
decisions. Each of the partners within the coalition has different distributional 
objectives and consequently an incentive to protect the budget share which may 
favor their own clientele (Roubini and Sachs, 1989a; 1989b). Political 
fragmentation may then increase the distribution of rents among politicians and 
engender a higher level of corruption. The use of this variable is also suggested by 
a change of the regional electoral system that occurred in 1995. The mechanism 
by which the members of the regional Council are elected switched from a pure 
proportional representation to a mixed one. A top-up number of seats for the 
winning coalition is also introduced, so that the absolute majority of the legislators 
will be held by the coalition linked to the regional list that has obtained the relative 
majority of the votes. Furthermore, the law reduced the tenure length of the Council 
from five to two years if the relationship of confidence between the Council and the 
regional government breaks down during the first two years. This reform was 
completed in 1999 when it was established that the President of the Region is 
                                                                                                         
6 Since until the late 1990s regional expenditure was financed through transfers from the central 
government, we do not include transfers among the independent variables. Nonetheless, we estimated 
a set of regressions with the inclusion of this variable and the results do not change. 
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elected by universal and direct suffrage. We measure government fragmentation 
with the Herfindahl index for concentration. The index is built by using the seats of 
the majority supporting the regional government with respect to the overall 
legislature and ranges from 0 (a legislature in which each legislator belongs to a 
different party) to 1 (when all members belong to the same party).7 Data come from 
the Ministero dell’Interno. On this variable we expect a negative coefficient. 
h) The share of Voluntary organizations over the population, the local Diffusion of 
newspapers and the share of voters that participate in referendums on the total of 
voters, Referendum voters. These variables proxy the degree of civicness of Italian 
regions as propensity of citizens to be politically involved and as general attitude 
towards corrupt practices. These three variables control for the degree of 
corruption generally ‘accepted and tolerated’ in each regional environment. FIVOL 
(Federazione Italiana per il Volontariato) is the source of data on voluntary 
organizations and the Ministero dell’Interno on the referendum voters. Data on the 
diffusion of newspapers come from ADS (Agenzia Diffusione Stampa).  
The second step consists in estimating the following growth equation: 
[2] GDPgrowthit = h(GDPgrowthit-1,Yit, CORRUPTION_Fit ,uit) 
for i=1,...,20 and t=1980,...,2004, where Y is a vector of standard economic growth 
models explanatory variables and u is the error term. Equation [2] substitutes the 
variables on corruption with the fitted values obtained in step 1, COR_F and 
COR+ASCR_F. 
The dependent variable of Equation [2] is GDPgrowth, the annual growth of GDP 
per capita as already defined.  
As measure of corruption we use the fitted values estimated in equation [1] 
(CORRUPTION_F). 
The vector Y includes a number of socio-economic and socio-demographic 
variables: 
i) The lagged growth level, GDPgrowthit-1. The coefficient of this variable indicates 
the average regional trend of growth, that is not predictable a priori. 
j) Fixed gross public and private investments, Investments/GDP. To avoid reverse 
causality, we introduce this variable with a one year lag and expect a positive 
correlation with the GDP. 
k) Public consumption/GDP and Private consumption/GDP are expected to be 
negatively correlated with economic growth. 
l) Expenditure/GDP is the total expenditure over the GDP, is expected to be 
positively correlated with economic growth, if productive.  
m) The first difference of the Gini index to capture the effect of a variation of 
inequality on growth. An unequal distribution of income is a barrier to growth 
because it generates a pressure to adopt redistributive policies that have an 
adverse effect on investment (Persson and Tabellini, 1994); present wealth, 
moreover, may depend on past wealth. Therefore, the more unequal a region is, 
the lower its growth rate.  
                                                                                                         
7 To calculate this index, we sum the seats of each party i of the majority, calculate the percentage s 
that these represent on the total number of seats of the Council and compute the Herfindahl index: 
 Ni sionFragmentat 1 2 , where N is the total number of seats of the Council. We then use the 
normalized Herfindahl index that ranges from 0 to 1 and is computed as follows: H*= (H-1/N)/(1-1/N), 
where again, N is the total number of seats of the Council and H is the usual Herfindahl index, as 
above. 
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n) School attainment is a proxy for the level of human capital in the regions, as 
previously defined. 
o) Labour force is the size of the labor force, that is to say the share of units of 
labor over the regional population. While Labor force is an indicator of the 
efficiency of the input labor, School attainment measures the quality of the input. 
We expect a positive sign associated to both these coefficients. 
Results 
Table 3 presents the results of the estimation of Equation [1]. Consistently with our 
predictions, high levels of corruption are associated with low levels of GDP growth 
and civicness, as the negative coefficients of Voluntary organizations, Diffusion of 
newspapers and Referendum voters show. The positive sign of the Diffusion of 
newspapers t-1 variable suggests that corruption is sensitive only to current 
information; in other words, the diffusion of newspapers is not an effective tool 
against corruption. This outcome seems to be in line with the positive sign on 
School attainment. Contrary to the prediction of the literature, our estimates show 
that education does not play a role in reducing corruption. Instead, as it clearly 
emerged in the so-called Mani Pulite investigation that signed the passing from a 
system of political patronage to a system of corruption that involved legislators, 
bureaucrats and businessmen, corruption in the 1980s and 1990s was typically a 
‘white collar’ phenomenon.  
Table 3. Estimation of Equation 1 
 COR COR+ASCR 
Population -0.05*** -0.017 
GDPgrowth -0.28*** -0.31*** 
School attainment 0.3* 0.35** 
Gini index -0.09 0.46 
Current expenditure/GDP -0.04 0.16 
Capital expenditure/GDP 0.08 0.053 
Number of laws 0.13** 0.12** 
Fragmentation 0.58*** 0.63*** 
Voluntary organizations -0.11** -0.13*** 
Diffusion of newspapers -0.33*** -0.36*** 
Diffusion of newspapers t-1 0.45*** 0.48*** 
Referendum voters -0.06 -0.07 
ASCR, associative corruption 
crimes 0.17***  
Constant 2.88** 3.35*** 
Observations 396 399 
R2 0.485 0.413 
Note: OLS regression, robust option specified. COR = individual corruption crimes; COR+ASCR = sum 
of all the crimes. Continuous variables in natural log. Significance level: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
The Number of laws and Fragmentation are, as predicted, positively correlated with 
corruption. Finally, the presence of associative crimes (ASCR) increases the level 
of individual crimes, bridging the two types of corruption. 
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Table 4. Estimates of Equation 2  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
GDP growth t-1 0.386*** 0.313*** 0.665*** 0.599*** 0.391*** 0.335*** 
Expenditure/GDP     0.002 0.107 
Investments/GDP lag 0.05 0.138 0.577 0.131 0.036 0.136 
Public 
consumption/GDP 
-1.22** -1.009** 0.007 -0.830 -1.235* -0.991* 
∆ Gini index -0.28 -0.009 0.512 0.496 -0.199 0.160 
School attainment 0.59** 0.75*** 0.065 0.749 0.679 0.886* 
Labour force -2.33** -2.48** -1.979 -2.481 -2.32* -2.462** 
COR_F -8.87***    -8.36***  
COR_F2 -0.50    -0.47***  
(COR+ASCR_F)  -2.3    -2.20*** 
(COR+ASCR_F) 2  -0.64***    -0.58*** 
Expenditure/GDP 
*COR_F 
  -0.254    
Expenditure/GDP 
*(COR+ASCR_F) 
   -4.51***   
Note: Dependent variable, natural log of GDP growth.  LSDVC estimation initialized with AB estimator, 
50 bootstrap repetitions. 396 observations. Continuous variables in natural log. Significance level: 
*p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
Table 4 presents the results of the growth equation using the LSDVC estimator, 
including the fitted values of the estimation of the corruption equation.8 The six 
models differ with respect to the explanatory variables they consider: models 1 - 4 
include the lagged value of investments, while models 5 - 6 also analyze the 
amount of public expenditure as a share of the GDP. Finally, models 3 - 4 interact 
the proxies for corruption with public expenditure to control for their combined 
effect on growth.9 This effect turns out to be negative and significant, suggesting 
that the presence of corruption nullifies the positive impact that public 
expenditures, when productive, have on growth. This result emphasizes the 
'sanding' impact of corruption. 
The variables of interest, i.e. the measures of corruption, are negative and 
significant as expected. In particular, COR_F and COR+ASCR_F are the elasticity 
of growth to corruption. A marginal variation of COR_F is associated with an 
opposite variation of economic growth of about 8%; the effect reduces to 2.2% for 
the sum of the crimes. The smaller coefficient associated to COR+ASCR_F 
indicates that the two types of corruption interact with the economic environment in 
a way that is complementary and not substitute to the economy itself. Associative 
crimes, in this perspective, seem to mitigate the impact of corruption on growth. 
The hypothesis of a non-linear relationship between corruption and growth has 
been tested by including the squared variables of corruption. The coefficients, 
however, do not show a growth-maximizing effect and rather describe a stable 
negative impact of corruption on growth. In other words, our results suggest that 
Italy is located on the negative slope of the non-linear relationship after the 
maximum point as the incidence of corruption is persistently high. 
The coefficients associated with the lagged dependent variable indicate a pattern 
of positive growth that is robust across the estimations. The regions have not yet 
                                                                                                         
8 The LSDVC estimates are robust to the application of the System GMM estimator and the estimation 
of a first difference IV regressions, instrumenting the lagged dependent variables with the lagged 
independent variables, and assuming corruption to be exogenous. As already said, the GMM estimation 
of Equation 2 never satisfies the rule of thumb, as in the most parsimonious specification we use 23 
instruments for 19 groups. 
9 The results are robust to the introduction of time effects. 
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reached a long-term equilibrium path of growth; full convergence is far from being 
reached. The coefficient on Investments/GDP lag is never significant, probably 
because the lack of disaggregated data on public and private investment hides 
large inefficiencies in public investment and generates this unexpected result.10 
Expenditure/GDP, similarly, is never statistically significant but shows the expected 
positive sign; public consumption negatively impacts on growth, but the coefficient 
is significant only in the models excluding the interaction between expenditures 
and corruption. The first difference of the Gini index, ∆Gini, is never significant and 
changes the sign across the models. Interestingly, School attainment is positive 
and Labor force is negative; both these covariates, however, are significant when 
lagged investments are included in the specification. The sign of these coefficients 
is motivated by a larger importance given to the quality of the labor force with 
respect to its size. 
Since government intervention has been the major policy to reduce income 
differentials between the North and the South of the country, we further investigate 
the role of public expenditures on economic growth in the Italian regions.11 In Table 
5 we present the estimation of a set of regression where total expenditure has 
been disaggregated into its main components12, i.e. current and capital 
expenditure.13 
The effects of the control variables are consistent with the results of Table 4. The 
variable Expenditure/GDP is never significant and also its disaggregation is not a 
significant determinant for growth. In particular, Capital expenditure/GDP fosters 
growth when controlling for corruption (Model 3), but it is not significant when 
controlling also for associative crimes (Model 4). This result is unexpected but 
suggests that the presence of criminal associations in some regions nullifies the 
productive content of capital investments.14 Since local governments have a certain 
degree of discretion to direct public investments, the efficiency of capital 
expenditure reasonably changes according to the economic environment where it 
is implemented. As matter of fact, the composition of crimes varies across 
observations and some regional economies are more affected by criminal 
infiltrations than others. Current expenditure/GDP, on the other hand, is usually 
more rigid as it includes mainly personnel wages, transfers to municipalities and 
local health units (called ASL). These items are not expected to stimulate growth 
but to face everyday needs; therefore, the negative but not significant signs we find 
in Models 3 and 4 do not contradict any theoretical prediction in the literature. In 
Models 5 - 8, where we use the lagged values of expenditure to overcome an 
eventual simultaneity of expenditure and growth, this pattern is confirmed. 
                                                                                                         
10 The disaggregated series of data on infrastructure expenditure, that better proxies public investment 
expenditure, is available only until 1991 (Del Monte and Papagni, 2001), and it has not been included in 
the analyses to avoid such a huge loss of information. 
11 On the nexus between the composition of public expenditure, corruption and growth see, among 
others, Goel and Nelson (1998), Mauro (1998), Tanzi and Davoodi (1998), Pieroni and D'Agostino 
(2009). 
12 The results are robust to the introduction of time effects. 
13 To avoid collinearity issues we exclude the lagged investments. 
14 Caruso (2009) shows that in the Italian regions in the period 1997-2003 investments in real estate 
sector, public investments and health expenditures are positively correlated with corruption, while social 
protection expenditure and private investments are negatively correlated with corruption. 
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Table 5. Estimates of Equation 2, disaggregated expenditure 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
GDP  
growth t-1 
0.397*** 0.352*** 0.352*** 0.307*** 0.374*** 0.327*** 0.377*** 0.316*** 
Expenditure
/GDP 
0.002 0.110       
Current 
expenditure
/GDP 
  -0.412 -0.253     
Capital 
expenditure
/GDP 
  0.130* 0.093     
Total 
expenditure
/GDP t-1 
    -0.104 0.012   
Current 
expenditure
/GDP t-1 
      -0.040 -0.013 
Capital 
expenditure
/GDP t-1 
      0.115 0.118* 
Public 
consumpt. 
-1.231** -0.960* -0.942 -0.818 -1.329** -1.026* -1.263** -1.048* 
∆ Gini index -0.186 0.185 -0.376 -0.059 -0.304 0.023 -0.196 0.103 
School 
attainment 
0.691 0.906** 0.567** 0.748*** 0.633 0.849** 0.593** 0.765*** 
Labour 
force 
-2.258** -2.286** -2.231** -2.31*** -2.037* -2.22** -2.329** -2.40*** 
COR_F -8.56***  -8.55***  -9.4***  -8.39***  
(COR_F)2 -0.48***  -0.48***  -0.53***  -0.47***  
COR+ 
ASCR_F  
 -2.22***  -2.26***  -2.32***  -2.26*** 
(COR+ 
ASCR_F)2  
 -0.58***  -0.62***  -0.63***  -0.61*** 
Note: Dependent variable: ln GDP growth.  LSDVC estimation initialized with AB estimator, 50 bootstrap 
repetitions. 396 observations. Continuous variables in natural log. Significance level: * p<0.05; **p<0.01; 
*** p<0.001 
The coefficients on COR_F and COR+ASCR_F (Table 5) are consistent with the 
prediction of the theory and with our previous estimations. They are significantly 
negative across all the models and show similar coefficients. In particular, as in 
Table 4, the effect of corruption crimes (Models 1, 3, 5 and 7) is always larger than 
the effect of the overall crimes (Models 2, 4, 6 and 8). Furthermore, the non-linear 
terms (COR_F)2 and (COR+ASCR_F)2 remain negative and significant as well and 
smaller than the linear ones. The empirical analyses indicate a sound negative 
effect of corruption on growth which is robust to different specifications of the 
model. The results do not verify the growth-maximizing hypothesis. 
Concluding remarks  
This paper investigates the effects of corruption on economic growth in the Italian 
regions during the period 1980 - 2004. Using a newly assembled data set that 
include economic, socio-demographic and politico-institutional variables, we 
address the potential bias of judicial measure of corruption and the endogeneity 
issue between corruption and growth by developing a two-step empirical strategy, 
Our results show a negative correlation between corruption and economic growth 
that is robust to different specifications of the model and econometric techniques. 
We further investigate the role of public expenditure on economic growth since 
government intervention has been traditionally the major policy implemented to 
reduce income differentials between the North and the South of the country. Total 
expenditure as well as its main components never turn out to be significant, 
suggesting that the presence of corruption undermines the positive impact that 
public expenditure generally has, if productive, on economic growth. 
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